



# The RUSI Journal

ISSN: 0307-1847 (Print) 1744-0378 (Online) Journal homepage: <http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rusi20>

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To cite this article: Martin Plaut (2018): The Ethiopian Famine, The RUSI Journal, DOI: [10.1080/03071847.2017.1414736](https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2017.1414736)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2017.1414736>



Published online: 18 Jan 2018.



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# THE ETHIOPIAN FAMINE

## WAR, WEAPONS AND AID

MARTIN PLAUT

**Did rebel movements in Ethiopia use part of the international aid they received for those who were starving to buy weapons and ammunition? Martin Plaut discusses the claims that the aid arm of the Tigray People's Liberation Front diverted some of these funds to purchase military supplies.**

Much has been written about the devastating Ethiopian famine of 1984–85. Yet next to nothing has appeared in academic publications concerning one critical issue: was a proportion of the international aid received by rebel movements used to buy weapons and ammunition? In some ways it is odd that this has not been considered since hundreds of millions of dollars were poured into a remote region in the grip of a fierce conflict.<sup>1</sup> The main rebel movement – the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) – had been fighting the Ethiopian government since it was founded in 1975. The group had begun its operations with just four outdated rifles, and although the TPLF subsequently captured equipment from the government,<sup>2</sup> it was short of arms and ammunition.<sup>3</sup> While the government was backed by the Soviet Union (which flew in vast quantities of weaponry and provided advice on how best to deploy them), the rebels had no similar backing.<sup>4</sup> What the rebel movement *did* have was the sympathy of many in the West.

The Tigrayans established relief organisations that channelled aid into the areas of Ethiopia bordering Sudan, paid for by Western governments and citizens. The arrival of such large sums of money must have been tempting for the rebels: in the circumstances,

it would have been surprising if they had not used some of the money to buy the weapons and ammunition they needed for their campaigns. This article examines claims that the aid arm of the TPLF used some of these funds to purchase the military supplies they needed so badly.<sup>5</sup>

### The Cross-Border Aid Operation

The most extensive, albeit still limited, study of how aid was transported into Ethiopia via Sudan was carried out by Mark Duffield and John Prendergast.<sup>6</sup> The scale of the operation was extraordinary. As they indicate, between 1981 and 1991 the Emergency Relief Desk (ERD), established by a range of church-based organisations from Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, Denmark, the US, Norway, Sudan and Sweden, delivered 750,000 tonnes of food aid into remote and inhospitable areas of western Ethiopia at a cost of around \$350 million.<sup>7</sup> The relief organisation established by the rebels (the Relief Society of Tigray, or REST) was allowed a degree of independence from the parent organisations, but in the end it was the rebels who exercised ultimate control over the relief effort. This situation was strengthened in late 1985, when the TPLF undertook a review of the aid operations and insisted that all staff should be its former fighters.<sup>8</sup>

On the key question of whether aid was used by the TPLF to finance its military operations, Duffield and Prendergast are less than forthcoming. They conclude that towards the end of the 1980s, 'ERD members became increasingly concerned as to whether ERD assistance was a contributory factor in the continuation of the war'.<sup>9</sup> The authors do not explain why this concern arose, but go on to say that, '[W]hile the direct military appropriation of relief assistance was never an intrinsic part of the political practice of the Fronts, through the fungibility of aid, the increasing resource substitution by the CBO [Cross Border Operation] probably did release Front energies for the war effort'.<sup>10</sup> Towards the end of their study they conclude: 'While the extent of substitution is difficult to quantify, that it took place is beyond doubt ... The principle of fungibility, however, underpinned by popular support, would suggest that substitution did allow Fronts to concentrate their available resources in securing their defence and ultimate military victory'.<sup>11</sup> Exactly what is covered by 'fungibility' is not spelled out and the phrase is probably carefully chosen: it obscures as much as it reveals, raising the question of the ends to which the aid was used without explaining exactly what is being implied. Perhaps the question was simply too sensitive, despite the passage of time.<sup>12</sup>

## The Allegation

The allegation that aid was diverted by the TPLF was made to this author in an interview for the BBC in 2010 by Aregawi Berhe, a founding member of the movement and its one-time military commander. It was repeated in Aregawi's doctoral thesis for the University of Leiden,<sup>13</sup> in which he says that at the height of the conflict and famine, between 12 and 25 July 1985, the TPLF held the founding congress of a Marxist party that would control the Front, the Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray (MLLT).<sup>14</sup> The MLLT was designed to be a hard-line vanguard party within the wider nationalist movement, which would direct the TPLF. Aregawi underlines just how important the congress was by pointing out that bringing together 500 delegates for such lengthy discussions diverted scarce resources from the needs of the people and the military.

Rebel movements are secretive organisations and the TPLF was no exception. Apart from Aregawi's book, few 'insiders' have been prepared to go into the details of these divisive events. The most comprehensive independent account in English is by journalist and academic, John Young, who describes the complex circumstances of drought, war and internal party machinations that led to the founding of the MLLT.<sup>15</sup> The intense discussions at the thirteen-day congress culminated in a marathon sixteen-hour debate between Meles Zenawi (a member of the Executive Committee of the TPLF since 1983) and Aregawi's ally, Ghidey Zera Tsion, the former vice-chairman of the TPLF and a leading Marxist theoretician of the movement.<sup>16</sup> It was a debate before the TPLF army that covered everything from military tactics to whether the rebels should be part of a wider multiparty, pan-Ethiopian alliance. In the end, the army voted against Aregawi and Ghidey, who soon after left the organisation. The arguments held and the decisions taken at the congress set the direction for the movement (and the country) for years to come. Meles took control of the Tigrayan rebellion and led it to victory in 1991, assuming the presidency and then the premiership of Ethiopia until his death in August 2012.



RAF C-130 airdropping food during the famine in Ethiopia, 1985. *Courtesy of Talskiddy/Wikimedia*

Aregawi says that decisions were taken at the congress regarding the allocation of aid.<sup>17</sup> 'By June 1985, REST had received more than US\$100 million from donors in the name of the famine victims. Abadi Zemo, the head of REST, handed the money to Awalom Woldu of the TPLF/MLLT's economic department, who in turn reported to the CC [Central Committee] that was in session for budgetary planning. Meles's proposal for the allocation of the relief aid money was as follows: 50% for MLLT consolidation, 45% for TPLF activities, and 5% for the famine victims'. Aregawi says he argued that the allotted amount for the famine victims was insufficient and should be significantly increased. The Meles group booed him and one of them interjected that he should understand that if the MLLT were strengthened, all problems would be solved scientifically. Most of them supported Meles and eventually the proposal was put into effect.<sup>18</sup>

Having lost votes at this critical juncture, Aregawi and his supporters were isolated, and, in fear for their lives, they fled into exile.<sup>19</sup>

## Weighing the Evidence

The suggestion that some funding was diverted for military and political purposes is not hard to believe. It is more difficult to accept that it was decided to allocate just 5 per cent of all the aid to the needs of the famine victims. Should this claim be considered in light of the fact that Aregawi had fallen out with the TPLF's leadership and gone into exile? It is quite possible that even if the TPLF did take the decision, it was imperfectly implemented and more aid went to the

relief operation. Since the archives of the TPLF are not available to the public, it is difficult to assess what actually took place. However, there are indications of what did happen.

Among the aid staff who worked so hard on the cross-border operation, transporting aid from Sudan or buying surpluses inside Ethiopia itself, was Max Peberdy, who acted for Christian Aid and REST. He wrote a brief but vivid account of what had taken place.<sup>20</sup> Peberdy explained how he went with an aid convoy into Tigray guarded by the TPLF carrying the equivalent of £30,000 donated by aid agencies, including Christian Aid, Norwegian Church Aid and Dutch Inter-Church Aid.<sup>21</sup> The booklet contains a black-and-white photograph showing Peberdy with two Tigrayans inside a hut. At their feet is a pile of currency, which the man to Peberdy's right is counting. The other Tigrayan, a REST official, is seen writing details of the purchase of grain in a notebook. The caption reads: 'Handing over the money for three hundred tonnes of sorghum'.<sup>22</sup> With a colleague (Kirsty Wright), Peberdy went with the convoy of trucks carrying the grain and saw it distributed. He and Wright reported to Christian Aid on how their mission had gone.<sup>23</sup>

When I interviewed him for the BBC, Peberdy was emphatic: he had seen the grain being bought; had seen it being given to the people. There was no diversion of funds. Others took another view. One of the men in the black-and-white photograph was Gebremedin Arayo, the 'merchant' selling the grain. I tracked him down to his home in Australia and he insisted that he and his colleague from REST (both of whom

were members of the TPLF) had pulled the wool over Peberdy's eyes.<sup>24</sup> It was, says Gebremedin, an elaborate charade. Half the sacks on the trucks were full of grain and the other half were filled with worthless sand. Gebremedin says that he handed the surplus cash over to the TPLF leadership.

The evidence from those who participated in these operations is therefore contradictory. No one would question the integrity or good intentions of aid workers such as Peberdy, whose efforts certainly saved the lives of tens of thousands of victims of the famine. The issue is whether it would have been possible for aid workers to credibly audit what was taking place. The convoys were taking grain to remote areas of western Ethiopia and the aid workers were entirely reliant on the TPLF and their associates in REST for information, guidance and translation. The author Robert Kaplan, who went into the TPLF-controlled areas during the famine, explained how difficult it was. 'I was to learn (during my trip in February 1986), nothing was easily verifiable in TPLF areas ... Western journalists in the 1980s found northern Ethiopia as baffling and incomprehensible as [the Scottish explorer James] Bruce must have found it more than two hundred years earlier. The TPLF ... was the product of a secretive, self-contained culture that for centuries eschewed contact with the outside world'.<sup>25</sup>

### Government Assessments

There is evidence that the US was well aware of how the Tigray rebels might be using its aid. An assessment of the political and security implications of the drought was undertaken by the CIA.<sup>26</sup> Its report, dated 3 April 1985, considered all aspects of the crisis, before turning to what it termed the 'northern insurgent organisations', which it said 'have been using the famine and relief efforts for their own purposes'. The report continues: 'The Relief Society of Tigray (REST), an arm of the Tigrean People's Liberation Front (TPLF), has helped move large numbers of refugees to Sudan – at least 120,000 to 130,000 according to US Embassy sources in Sudan'.<sup>27</sup> This assessment is supported by Gayle Smith, a close associate of the TPLF (and later head of the American

government's aid arm, USAID), who argued that: 'The objective of the two fronts was to contain the population within their zones of control, while government strategy revolved around drawing hungry peasants into the urban centers'.<sup>28</sup> The Ethiopian government wished to resettle the peasantry in the lowlands, away from Tigray, to erode the support of the rebel movement, while the TPLF was determined to maintain its popular base by moving tens of thousands to Sudan. As Smith puts it: 'While the government organized a campaign to resettle Tigrayans (and other northern Ethiopians) forcibly to the south, REST organized an exodus of over 200,000 farmers to emergency border camps in Sudan between October 1984 and April 1985'.<sup>29</sup>

The CIA report concludes that:

Some funds that insurgent organizations are raising for relief operations, as a result of increased world publicity, are almost certainly being diverted for military purposes. Moreover, the guerrillas probably have recruited additional troops from among victims of the famine and as a result of their control of the refugee camps in Sudan. The rebels' ability to absorb the new recruits, however, will continue to be restricted by a shortage of weapons and other military supplies.<sup>30</sup>

The British government's records indicate no similar concern. Rather, there was a belief that the cross-border operation should not imperil British relations with the Ethiopian government. This was a real issue, as the British ambassador to Ethiopia, Brian Barder, made clear in a telegram dated 15 February 1985, in which he relayed the views of the Ethiopian government:

Delivery of relief aid to rebel-held areas in Tigray and Eritrea: Ethiopian government could not enter into agreement for ceasefire, truce or safe passage arrangements since this would confer legitimacy and recognition on those fighting to destroy Ethiopian territorial integrity. Ethiopia would never cease resisting these bandits. Such agreement was anyway unnecessary

as areas controlled by rebels contain no significant population groups. International organisations should work with the RRC [the Ethiopian government's Relief and Rehabilitation Commission] to get food to areas of need, if necessary with military protection from Ethiopian forces. Ethiopia could not agree to provision of supplies to rebel organisations with inevitable effect of strengthening their logistics. There was no objection to provision of aid through Sudan provided it was under Ethiopian government control: they could not trust even purportedly neutral observers to keep it out of rebel hands.<sup>31</sup>

The Ethiopian government's refusal to accept any aid being sent via the rebels was underlined when Barder reported that the administrator of Eritrea had informed him during a visit to the region that he would be obliged to open fire on anyone entering Ethiopia without government authorisation.<sup>32</sup>

This view was reinforced by Alexander Stirling, the British ambassador to Khartoum, who told London that there was 'no possibility' of the Ethiopian government accepting a deal by which aid flowed via rebel-controlled organisations.<sup>33</sup> Yet, despite the Ethiopian government's concerns, such was the scale of the crisis that the cross-border operation was agreed to by the West and did indeed take place, although it was stressed that the aid should be kept as low-key as possible.<sup>34</sup> The British government did all it could not to exacerbate Ethiopia's anger at the operation and refused to deal directly with the TPLF, or its aid arm, REST.<sup>35</sup>

A low-level, cross-border operation, undertaken by international aid agencies, backed by Western government funding, was therefore British government policy. Yet the attitude of then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was somewhat different. On 18 September 1985, the foreign secretary, Geoffrey Howe, wrote to Thatcher to discuss what he called 'the political implications of the aid we give to Ethiopia'.<sup>36</sup> 'Our aid is inevitably helping a regime which is harsh and repressive. This poses a real policy dilemma'.<sup>37</sup> Scribbled on the letter is a note from Thatcher's private secretary, Charles Powell: 'There

is little hope of influencing Ethiopia through the European Community: the others simply won't join in. And we give no bilateral financial aid, only emergency relief. There is therefore little to which we can attach strings. But we ought to do something. FCO to think harder?'.<sup>38</sup> Next to this is a simple 'Yes' and the prime minister's initials. Powell wrote to the Foreign Office on 23 September, saying that the prime minister wanted to know:

[How] far we are presently trying to influence the Ethiopian government and in what ways. Are we doing so? Or have we given up? Can we do more by co-operating with other countries in the region? Would we be better off by joining the United States in a policy of containment? In short, the Prime Minister recognises the difficulties but thinks that a rather more imaginative study is required which examines other options as well as that of trying to use the EC aid as a lever.<sup>39</sup>

A letter from the Foreign Office, dated 27 November, offered little in the way of the 'imaginative' thinking the prime minister was looking for.<sup>40</sup> Rather it noted that the US had rejected a policy of 'containment' and fallen in with British policy. To this, Powell wrote simply in the margin: 'Has it?'. The letter ended: 'To sum up, the prospects of exerting any significant influence on the Ethiopian Government are far from good'.

Powell, clearly frustrated with what he saw as an inability of the Foreign Office to think outside the box, wrote a note to Thatcher on 28 November, marking it 'Top Secret and Personal':<sup>41</sup>

You asked for more thought from the FCO on how we could influence the unpleasant regime in Ethiopia ... the FCO response ... lists exhaustively the reasons why we can't. It is probably the case that we can't do much to influence them through normal channels. But we can make life harder for them in a number of ways. i) Support for the rebels in Eritrea and Tigray, who are already backed by the Saudis and Kuwaitis. (The FCO, on the other hand, conclude that it would be better to discourage the Saudis and Kuwaitis from giving the rebels further

support.) ... iv) a more active effort in conjunction with the Americans to identify and perhaps encourage opponents of Mengistu within the country.<sup>42</sup>

Powell ended his note asking the prime minister whether she preferred to 'continue as we are' (next to which she wrote: 'No') or 'examine scope for action outlined above' (next to which she wrote: 'Yes').

Powell sent a formal letter along these lines, again marked 'Top Secret and Personal', to the Foreign Office on 29 November.<sup>43</sup> It ended with the warning: 'You will recognise the sensitivity of this letter'. It is worth noting just how radical these proposals were. Thatcher was, in effect, calling for measures to undermine, if not actually overthrow, the Ethiopian government with which it was cooperating to fight the famine. The reply took a while, but on 10 January 1986 it came: 'The Foreign Secretary agrees that jogging along with the Ethiopian regime would not be right'.<sup>44</sup> It then outlined a series of less than radical measures. Powell noted in the margin: 'Prime Minister, Pretty much of a nil return, but a stepped up effort and some sign of a more robust attitude by the EC. Agree to leave it at that for the time being?'.<sup>45</sup> Thatcher simply initialled his note.

Reflecting on these events recently, Powell says he cannot recall the details of the events, but that he 'doubts' that the proposal to fund the Tigray rebels came entirely from what he described as 'my fertile mind'.<sup>46</sup> Rather, he believes that the plan may have come from MI6. 'I probably talked to them about it', he says, although he cannot now recall the conversation, remarking that he seldom worked with the intelligence services on Africa, but rather on the Soviet Union. It may well be that the British secret services did indeed consider the impact of aid flows on the Ethiopian civil war, but since their files are seldom, if ever, made public, this is difficult to corroborate.

Nigel Wenban-Smith, the Foreign Office officer responsible for the Horn of Africa during the early part of this famine, has a different explanation.<sup>47</sup> He believes the suggestion could have come from two

advocates who had access to Thatcher: Louis Fitzgibbon (an author who took a strongly pro-Somali view of the region) or Patrick Wall (a Conservative MP with fiercely anti-communist views). All that can be said for certain is that the public record does not reveal any further action from Britain, despite Thatcher's desire to take stronger measures against the Ethiopian government.

## Conclusion

It is not possible to draw a definitive conclusion from the evidence present above. The TPLF rebels certainly had a strong incentive to use the millions of dollars passing through the hands of REST to fund their war effort. The CIA believed that the funds were 'almost certainly' being used for military purposes. The TPLF was fighting a war against the Mengistu regime while critically short of arms and ammunition. Would Thatcher have stood in the way of aid being used by the TPLF to purchase weapons, since this would have undermined the government that she clearly loathed? She may have received security briefings that this was indeed taking place, despite the clear reservations of the Foreign Office. Senior former rebel commanders say – on the record – that the TPLF did indeed decide to use the aid for military purposes, but their testimony may be coloured by their opposition to their former comrades, with whom they had fallen out. The aid officials who participated in the cross-border operations say none of the cash they carried or gave went astray. However, as has been indicated, this is something that they would have had difficulty in ascertaining with any degree of certainty.

After the BBC programme was broadcast, I was in contact with Jon Bennett, a development expert who had worked with the charity Band Aid in the 1980s. He explained that he had been one of the first Westerners to enter Tigray with the TPLF. Bennett said that it was not clear whether aid was being diverted to buy weapons.<sup>48</sup> He believed it could have happened, even if he did not accept the figures suggested by Aregawi. 'I did see distributions of food taking place, but I had no idea how much had been distributed. It is most likely that we were being duped, but

not as widely as was alleged in the [BBC] programme’.

It would appear that this is an accurate assessment and about as far as can be said from the available information. What is a little mystifying is why this issue has previously not been aired in the extensive mainstream academic literature covering the Ethiopian famine. Perhaps this article will spark a wider debate. ■

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*reported from the far north of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the attacks by the Lord’s Resistance Army and covered Sudan’s many crises on several occasions. He retired from the BBC in 2013. He served as Vice-Chair of War on Want from 1984–85 and on the board of Justice Africa in 2013. His latest book is Understanding Eritrea: Inside Africa’s most Repressive State (Hurst 2016).*

## Notes

- 1 See, for example, Edmund J Keller, ‘Drought, War and the Politics of Famine in Ethiopia and Eritrea’, *Journal of Modern African History* (Vol. 30, No. 4, 1992), pp. 609–24.
- 2 As a CIA assessment dated 4 November 1983 put it: ‘Since the late 1970’s [sic] the Tigrean People’s Liberation Front has sought economic and military assistance from several Arab states – especially Saudi Arabia – and the West. The movement’s Marxist reputation and its predominantly Christian membership have effectively deterred Arab support, however, and there has been little response from Western nations unwilling to jeopardize relations with Addis Ababa. As a result, the TPLF has been forced to rely on arms captured from the Ethiopians or those provided by such sources as Sudan and the larger, more self-sufficient EPLF, which has a large stock of captured equipment and the capability to produce some light armaments and repair damaged weapons and vehicles ... They [the TPLF] have ambushed convoys of regular Army forces, raided isolated garrisons, taken foreigners hostage, and attacked government facilities in large towns to gain publicity or to capture supplies’. CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, ‘Ethiopia: The Tigrean Insurgency’, 4 November 1983, <<https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85T00287R000500100001-7.pdf>>, accessed 1 December 2017. A similar assessment was made by the CIA in October 1984, in its Research Paper, ‘Ethiopia: The Northern Insurgencies’, 21 October 1984, <<https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85S00317R000300050001-2.pdf>>, accessed 1 December 2017.
- 3 Aregawi Berhe, *A Political History of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (1975-1991): Revolt, Ideology and Mobilisation in Ethiopia* (Los Angeles, CA: Tsehai Publishers, 2009), p. 70.
- 4 Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 276.
- 5 See Martin Plaut, ‘On the Trail of Ethiopia Aid and Guns’, *BBC From Our Own Correspondent*, 4 March 2010. The programme led to a complaint from Bob Geldof and the charity Band Aid Trust. The BBC found in Geldof’s favour and apologised over the Band Aid reports. See *BBC News*, ‘BBC Apologises over Band Aid Money Reports’, 4 November 2010. This article does not consider the programme, nor make any claims regarding Bob Geldof or Band Aid. It is a review of how aid was used, not about the originators of the aid.
- 6 Mark Duffield and John Prendergast, *Without Troops and Tanks: Humanitarian Intervention in Ethiopia and Eritrea* (Lawrenceville, GA: Red Sea Press, 1994). The authors, writing within a decade of the events they described, were unable to draw on subsequent publications.
- 7 Duffield and Prendergast, *Without Troops and Tanks*, p. 13.
- 8 *Ibid.*, p. 103.
- 9 *Ibid.*, p. 14.
- 10 *Ibid.* The key movements involved in the conflict were the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (founded 1970), which fought for the independence of Eritrea from Ethiopia, and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (founded 1975), which began by fighting for the independence of Tigray, but later changed its goals to the overthrow of the Ethiopian government. They were both fighting the Ethiopian government and cooperated with each other in a difficult alliance that sometimes disintegrated into bitter feuding, but finally culminated in the defeat of the Ethiopian military in Eritrea and Ethiopia.
- 11 Duffield and Prendergast, *Without Troops and Tanks*, p. 163.
- 12 Even in 2010, some participants in the famine relief operation were still reticent to talk to me for the BBC programme I produced.
- 13 Aregawi Berhe, ‘A Political History of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (1975-1991): Revolt, Ideology and Mobilisation in Ethiopia’, Doctoral Thesis, Free University of Amsterdam, 2008. The thesis formed the basis of a book by the same title.

- 14 Aregawi, *A Political History of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (1975-1991)*, pp. 169–92
- 15 John Young, *Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia: The Tigray People's Liberation Front, 1975–1991* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 130–44.
- 16 *Ibid.*, p. 138.
- 17 Aregawi, *A Political History of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (1975-1991)*, p. 184.
- 18 *Ibid.*, p. 184.
- 19 *Ibid.*, p. 184–85.
- 20 Max Peberdy, *Tigray: Ethiopia's Untold Story* (London: Relief Society of Tigray UK Support Committee, 1985).
- 21 *Ibid.*, p. 27.
- 22 *Ibid.*, p. 28.
- 23 *Ibid.*, p. 60.
- 24 Author interview with Gebremedin Arayo, by telephone, 2010. 'I was receiving the money. They told the NGOs, there is a merchant who sells different types of crops. It is me. I am a TPLF [member], not a merchant. I show them 10,000 quintals of grain. It is not all grain. The front side is grain and the other side
- is sacks of sand. If there is 1,000 quintals of grain then 500 are full of sand.
- 25 Robert D Kaplan, *Surrender or Starve: The World Behind the Famine* (Boulder, CO and London: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 88–89. I visited similar areas of Eritrea and can attest to how hard it was to know where I was being taken or who I was meeting.
- 26 CIA, 'Ethiopia: Political and Security Impact of the Drought: An Intelligence Assessment', 3 April 1985.
- 27 *Ibid.*, p. 6.
- 28 Gayle Smith, 'Ethiopia and the Politics of Famine Relief', *Middle East Report* (Vol. 17, No. 145, March/April 1987).
- 29 *Ibid.*
- 30 CIA, 'Ethiopia: Political and Security Impact of the Drought: An Intelligence Assessment', p. 6.
- 31 National Archive, FO 31/4612.
- 32 Telegram, 4 March 1985, National Archive, FO 31/4612.
- 33 Telegram, 24 February 1985, National archive, FO 31/4612.
- 34 Stirling to London, Telegram, 12 May 1985, National Archive, FO 31/4613.
- 35 Wenban-Smith to Rifkind, 12 April 1985, National Archive, FO 31/4613, confirmed by Rifkind to Wenban-Smith, 16 April 1985, National Archive, FO 31/4613.
- 36 National Archive, PREM 19/1699.
- 37 *Ibid.*
- 38 *Ibid.*
- 39 *Ibid.*
- 40 *Ibid.*
- 41 *Ibid.*
- 42 *Ibid.* Emphasis in the original.
- 43 *Ibid.*
- 44 *Ibid.*
- 45 *Ibid.* Emphasis in the original.
- 46 Author interview with Lord Powell, London, 14 February 2017.
- 47 Author interview with Nigel Wenban-Smith, London, 20 March 2017.
- 48 Author interview with Jon Bennett by telephone, 6 August 2010.